Author confirmation governs this page: personhood is explicitly plural; the “self” does not resolve to a unitary entity, and this is meant literally rather than as a metaphor for ordinary role-playing. Historical comparisons below are coordinates, not a claim that all traditions say the same thing.
Not a diagnostic page. Philosophical/religious plural-personhood comparisons must not be converted into psychiatric diagnosis, nor should psychiatric categories be used as shortcuts for metaphysical claims.

Control case: Gurdjieff / Fourth Way

The “many I’ed” formulation in ADVENT 1.1 was deliberately made in contact with the Fourth Way “many I’s” model. This is AUTHOR CONFIRMATION. The useful split is equally important: Fourth Way accounts generally treat multiplicity as a condition from which greater unity / a more stable “I” might be developed. JQD’s confirmed proposition does not require plurality to resolve into one final person beneath the persons.

Comparative matrix

Tradition / figureRelationUseful rhymeDecisive differenceGenealogy?
Gurdjieff / Fourth WayAUTHOR-CONFIRMED CONTACTOrdinary “one person” is not a simple given; many temporary I’s can occupy the apparatus.Fourth Way practice often aims toward greater unity; JQD plurality need not culminate in a final unitary self.Yes: deliberate contact confirmed by author.
Indian Buddhist not-self / anātmanSAME STREETNo independent, enduring substantial self need sit behind changing psycho-physical processes.Not-self is not identical to the positive claim “personhood is plural.” Buddhist systems carry soteriological commitments the JQD proposition does not automatically inherit.No claim of source contact here.
Advaita VedāntaARGUMENT / FOILEveryday ego/individuality is not the final truth of personhood.Almost an inverse coordinate: Advaita seeks the essential self as nondual brahman, transcending empirical plurality; JQD refuses a required final unit behind plurality.Comparison / foil only.
Ancient Egyptian composite personSAME STREETA person can be constituted by several differentiated elements rather than one indivisible soul-object.Ka/ba/akh belong to a specific funerary cosmology; structural resemblance is not equivalence.Comparison only.
Fernando Pessoa / heteronymsSAME STREETAuthorship can be populated by differentiated persons rather than ordinary pen names.Pessoa is an artistic construction of authored persons; JQD’s proposition is ontological and not exhausted by persona-making.Comparison; separate evidence needed for influence.
David Hume / bundle theoriesSAME STREETThe introspected self may be a succession/bundle rather than a simple substance.Bundle reduction and literal plurality are not automatically the same claim.Comparison only.
William James / social selvesSAME STREETDifferent social relations can sustain materially different selves.Social plurality alone does not reach the full JQD claim that no unitary entity is required underneath.Comparison only.
Derek Parfit / reductionismSAME STREETPersonal identity may matter less than psychological continuity/connectedness.Reduction of identity conditions is not the same as a plurality of persons.Comparison only.

Distributed, possessed and collective agencies inside the corpus

The corpus’s own vocabulary makes the comparative problem stranger: egregore, possession, vessel/medium language, Enochian material, sigils, corporate personae, synthetic speakers, institutional voices, masks and audiences all create situations where agency is difficult to assign to a solitary interior author. These are not automatically evidence for one occult doctrine. They are recurrent ways of making agency visibly distributed.

This is also where mundus vult decipi intersects personhood: a persona or institution can be collectively sustained because several parties knowingly continue to behave inside the construction. The resulting person can be socially real without being ontologically simple.

Differences are the point

A comparative page fails if every tradition is translated into “the self is an illusion.” The important axes are different: no-self vs. many selves; empirical multiplicity vs. ultimate unity; authored personae vs. literal ontology; social multiplicity vs. metaphysical plurality; temporary roles vs. independent agency; fragmentation as problem vs. plurality as ordinary fact.

External orientation

Background only, not genealogy: Stanford Encyclopedia on Indian Buddhist mind / not-self ↗ · Stanford Encyclopedia on Śaṅkara / Advaita ↗ · British Museum on ka, ba and akh ↗ · Poetry Society on Pessoa’s heteronyms ↗.